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HIGH

HPACK-indexed cookie fields in Mint HTTP/2 responses bypass max_header_list_size and exhaust client memory

Published Sep 28, 2026

Description

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/2 server to exhaust memory on the client host and cause a denial of service.

Mint.HTTP2 enforces the client's max_header_list_size setting only on the compressed size of an inbound header block, while RFC 9113 section 6.5.2 defines the limit on the decoded header list. An HPACK indexed field costs one byte on the wire and decodes to a dynamic table entry of up to 4 KB, and join_cookie_headers/1 in lib/mint/http2.ex copies every cookie value of a response into one new binary. A header block under the default 256 KB wire limit therefore makes the client allocate about 1 GB for a single response, and several such responses in one delivery exhaust the memory of the process that owns the connection or of the whole VM.

This issue affects mint: from 1.1.0 before 1.10.2.

Affected products

Remediation

Vendor solution

Lower client_settings: [max_header_list_size: n] in Mint.HTTP.connect/4. The compressed check still applies, and each byte of the block can expand to at most one 4 KB table entry, so a limit of 4,096 bounds a response to roughly 16 MB. Alternatively, restrict connections to untrusted servers to HTTP/1 with protocols: [:http1], which avoids the HTTP/2 receive path entirely. Do not set max_header_list_size: :infinity, which disables the compressed check as well.

References (7)

Change history (0)

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Sources
CVE.org / MITRE
Status PUBLISHED
Assigner EEF
Published Sep 28, 2026
Updated Sep 29, 2026
Reserved Sep 15, 2026
CISA Vulnrichment
Updated Sep 28, 2026
NVD
Status Received
Modified Sep 28, 2026
Red Hat
Severity n/a
Public date n/a
ENISA EUVD
Assigner EEF
Published Sep 28, 2026
Updated Sep 29, 2026
Exploited since n/a
EUVD-2026-88218