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CRITICAL

fs/ntfs3: validate ef->size covers the record's name and value

Published Sep 16, 2026

Description

When an EA record has a non-zero ef->size, ntfs_read_ea() only checks that the record fits in the remaining buffer (ea_size > bytes), not that ef->size is large enough to hold the record's own name_len + 1 + elength.

A crafted image can pass validation with, e.g., ef->size = 24 but elength = 0xffff. ntfs_get_ea() then trusts elength and copies it out of the undersized record, reading past the kmalloc(info->size) allocation and leaking heap memory to userspace via getxattr():

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ntfs_get_ea (fs/ntfs3/xattr.c:302) Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888100794550 by task exploit __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) ntfs_get_ea (fs/ntfs3/xattr.c:302) ntfs_getxattr (fs/ntfs3/xattr.c:848) __vfs_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:441) vfs_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:474) do_getxattr (fs/xattr.c:800) path_getxattrat (fs/xattr.c:868) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)

The buggy address is located 80 bytes inside of allocated 84-byte region in cache kmalloc-96

Compute the size the record needs and require ef->size to cover it.

Affected products

Remediation

No remediation recorded yet.

Weaknesses (0)

No CWE recorded.

References (8)

Change history (0)

No recorded changes yet.

Sources
CVE.org / MITRE
Status PUBLISHED
Assigner Linux
Published Sep 16, 2026
Updated Sep 16, 2026
Reserved Sep 11, 2026
NVD
Status Received
Modified Sep 16, 2026
Red Hat
Severity n/a
Public date n/a
ENISA EUVD
Assigner Linux
Published Sep 16, 2026
Updated Sep 16, 2026
Exploited since n/a
EUVD-2026-80300