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MEDIUM

HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received

Published Sep 11, 2026

Description

picolcd_debug_eeprom_read() trusts resp->raw_data[2] -- a length byte supplied by the device in its REPORT_EE_DATA reply -- clamped only to the caller's read() count:

ret = resp->raw_data[2]; if (ret > s) ret = s; if (copy_to_user(u, resp->raw_data+3, ret))

It never checks resp->raw_size, the number of bytes picolcd_raw_event() actually copied into the 64-byte raw_data[] of the kmalloc'd struct picolcd_pending. A device (or a spoofed picoLCD) returning a length byte of 0xff, read with a count >= 255, makes copy_to_user() read past raw_data[] into adjacent slab memory and return it to userspace through the debugfs "eeprom" file:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user Read of size 255 ... picolcd_debug_eeprom_read+0x214/0x2f0 [hid_picolcd]

The debug-dump path in the same file already validates the device length byte against the received size before trusting it; this read does not. The file is created S_IRUSR (root-only) and a crafted device is needed, so it is neither unprivileged- nor remotely-triggerable.

Clamp the copy length to resp->raw_size - 3 (the payload actually received, minus the 3-byte header), floored at 0 for short replies.

Affected products

Remediation

No remediation recorded yet.

Weaknesses (1)

References (13)

Change history (0)

No recorded changes yet.

Sources
CVE.org / MITRE
Status PUBLISHED
Assigner Linux
Published Sep 11, 2026
Updated Sep 14, 2026
Reserved Sep 11, 2026
NVD
Status Received
Modified Sep 14, 2026
Red Hat
Severity Moderate
Public date Sep 11, 2026
ENISA EUVD
Assigner n/a
Published n/a
Updated n/a
Exploited since n/a
Link n/a