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HIGH

SeaweedFS: Authenticated S3 object-scope bypass in PutObjectAcl allows overwriting a different object with the same basename

Published Aug 26, 2026

Description

SeaweedFS is a distributed storage system for files and blobs. In versions prior to 4.40, an authenticated S3 principal with permissions scoped to a nested object key can overwrite a different object outside that scope by calling PutObjectAcl on the key it is allowed to access. The handler authorizes the request against the requested nested key but then writes the updated entry back to the bucket root rather than the key's actual parent directory, so an ACL change on allowed/protected.txt is instead applied to protected.txt at the bucket root. Because the update carries the full entry rather than only ACL metadata, an existing target object is overwritten with the content, metadata, owner information, and ACL of the scoped object, bypassing the object-level action scoping configured through the static S3 identity file. This issue is fixed in version 4.40.

Affected products

Remediation

No remediation recorded yet.

Metrics

References (2)

Change history (0)

No recorded changes yet.

Sources
CVE.org / MITRE
Status PUBLISHED
Assigner GitHub_M
Published Aug 26, 2026
Updated Aug 27, 2026
Reserved Aug 20, 2026
CISA Vulnrichment
Updated Aug 27, 2026
NVD
Status Deferred
Modified Sep 9, 2026
Red Hat
Severity n/a
Public date n/a