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CRITICAL

sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use

Published Aug 26, 2026

Description

When cookie authentication is disabled, COOKIE_ECHO restores fixed-size AUTH fields directly from peer-controlled cookie bytes. A forged RANDOM length, HMAC list, or CHUNKS list can then reach association consumers with lengths or identifiers that were never validated against the local backing arrays.

A forged RANDOM length can cause out-of-bounds reads during key-vector construction. A forged HMAC identifier also caused a 32-byte write past a zero-length AUTH chunk, providing a primitive for a local privilege escalation chain.

Validate the cookie's RANDOM, HMACS, and CHUNKS parameters at the cookie trust boundary before copying them into the association. Reject invalid types, malformed lengths, unsupported HMAC identifiers, HMAC lists without SHA1, and forbidden chunk ids.

Affected products

Remediation

Red Hat statement

This Important flaw in the Linux kernel's Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) implementation could allow a local attacker to achieve privilege escalation. When SCTP cookie authentication is disabled, the kernel fails to properly validate AUTH fields from peer-controlled cookie bytes, leading to out-of-bounds memory access. This could result in a local privilege escalation.

Red Hat mitigation

To mitigate this vulnerability, prevent the `sctp` kernel module from loading by creating a blacklist configuration as detailed below. [How do I prevent a kernel module from loading automatically?](https://access.redhat.com/solutions/41278) Note: Disabling the `sctp` module may impact services that rely on SCTP for communication. A system reboot is required for the mitigation to be fully applied.

Weaknesses (1)

References (7)

Change history (0)

No recorded changes yet.

Sources
CVE.org / MITRE
Status PUBLISHED
Assigner Linux
Published Aug 26, 2026
Updated Aug 27, 2026
Reserved Aug 15, 2026
NVD
Status Received
Modified Aug 27, 2026
Red Hat
Severity Important
Public date Aug 26, 2026