CVE-2026-73585

Vendor solution

To mitigate this issue, ensure sticky-directory symlink protections are enabled on your system. This can be done immediately by running `sysctl -w fs.protected_symlinks=1`. To make this change persistent across reboots, create or modify a file in `/etc/sysctl.d/` (e.g., `/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf`) with the content `fs.protected_symlinks=1` and then run `sysctl --system`. Additionally, avoid running the `sblim-cmpi-base` provider registration scripts from shared multi-user systems where untrusted users can create symlinks in `/tmp` or `/var/tmp`. If manual execution of the script is necessary, prefer using a private, root-owned temporary directory.

Red Hat statement

Moderate: This flaw in `sblim-cmpi-base` provider registration scripts allows a local unprivileged attacker to overwrite root-owned files via a symlink attack in world-writable temporary directories. Exploitation requires specific conditions, including a privileged script execution and systems without sticky-directory symlink protections, which reduces its overall impact.

Red Hat mitigation

To mitigate this issue, ensure sticky-directory symlink protections are enabled on your system. This can be done immediately by running `sysctl -w fs.protected_symlinks=1`. To make this change persistent across reboots, create or modify a file in `/etc/sysctl.d/` (e.g., `/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf`) with the content `fs.protected_symlinks=1` and then run `sysctl --system`. Additionally, avoid running the `sblim-cmpi-base` provider registration scripts from shared multi-user systems where untrusted users can create symlinks in `/tmp` or `/var/tmp`. If manual execution of the script is necessary, prefer using a private, root-owned temporary directory.