CVE-2026-64293

The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr):

if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) && sizeof(hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) {

hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently:

if (done >= count || sizeof(*hdr) > count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr);

struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended.

On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur->data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur->data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer.

It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width.

Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied.

No remediation recorded yet.