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MEDIUM

Sign-tolerant HTTP/1 chunk-size parser in Mint enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections

Published Jul 16, 2026

Description

Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP response smuggling) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on the same pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection.

The Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 function in lib/mint/http1.ex parses the chunk-size line of a Transfer-Encoding: chunked response with Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG and forbids any sign prefix, but Integer.parse/2 accepts an optional leading + or -. A chunk-size line of +5 is accepted as a five-byte chunk; lines of +0 and -0 are accepted as the terminating zero-length chunk and end the message body early.

An RFC-strict intermediary in the response path rejects these forms, so the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on where one response ends and the next begins. On a pooled keep-alive connection, an attacker-influenced origin can inject bytes that the client attributes to the next legitimate response on the same connection, poisoning the response queue and corrupting the responses returned to unrelated in-flight requests.

This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.3.

Affected products

Remediation

No remediation recorded yet.

Weaknesses (1)

References (5)

Change history (0)

No recorded changes yet.

Sources
CVE.org / MITRE
Status PUBLISHED
Assigner EEF
Published Jul 16, 2026
Updated Jul 17, 2026
Reserved Jul 4, 2026
CISA Vulnrichment
Updated Jul 16, 2026
NVD
Status Deferred
Modified Jul 16, 2026
Red Hat
Severity n/a
Public date n/a
ENISA EUVD
Assigner EEF
Published Jul 16, 2026
Updated Jul 17, 2026
Exploited since n/a
EUVD-2026-44909