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MEDIUM

Lemur : JWT verifier trusts attacker-supplied alg from token header — defense-in-depth gap; chain-dependent ATO with secret disclosure

Published Aug 18, 2026

Description

Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.2, the JWT verifier in lemur/auth/service.py:130-137 used fetch_token_header to read header_data["alg"] from an unverified token and passed that attacker-controlled value to decode_with_multiple_secrets. PyJWT 2.x rejects alg=none with the configured key, so the flaw is a defense-in-depth gap rather than a direct authentication bypass in the shipped configuration. The unpinned algorithm can become exploitable after an asymmetric-signing migration through algorithm confusion, and it weakens algorithm-based anomaly detection because the token chooses the recorded value. A separate disclosure of LEMUR_TOKEN_SECRET would also permit forged HS256 tokens, although that disclosure is an independent prerequisite. The fix introduces the server-controlled LEMUR_TOKEN_ALGORITHMS allowlist and defaults it to HS256. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.2.

Affected products

Remediation

No remediation recorded yet.

Weaknesses (1)

References (5)

Change history (0)

No recorded changes yet.

Sources
CVE.org / MITRE
Status PUBLISHED
Assigner GitHub_M
Published Aug 18, 2026
Updated Aug 18, 2026
Reserved Jun 16, 2026
CISA Vulnrichment
Updated Aug 18, 2026
NVD
Status Deferred
Modified Sep 8, 2026
Red Hat
Severity n/a
Public date n/a
ENISA EUVD
Assigner GitHub_M
Published Aug 18, 2026
Updated Aug 18, 2026
Exploited since n/a
EUVD-2026-61146 GHSA-R9GP-7F88-9R54