Back

LOW

SSL/TLS: CBC padding timing attack (lucky-13)

Published Feb 8, 2013

Description

The TLS protocol 1.1 and 1.2 and the DTLS protocol 1.0 and 1.2, as used in OpenSSL, OpenJDK, PolarSSL, and other products, do not properly consider timing side-channel attacks on a MAC check requirement during the processing of malformed CBC padding, which allows remote attackers to conduct distinguishing attacks and plaintext-recovery attacks via statistical analysis of timing data for crafted packets, aka the "Lucky Thirteen" issue.

Affected products

Remediation

Red Hat mitigation

On OpenShift Container Platform 3.11 it's possible to edit the list of cipher suites offered by the router when performing 'edge', or 're-encrypt' TLS modes. Please follow the documentation [1], and [2] to remove the vulnerable CBC ciphers use the modern, or intermediate cipher suites outlined by Mozilla instead [3]. In 'passthrough' mode TLS termination occurs in the application so that is another way to mitigate the vulnerability. [1] https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/3.11/install_config/router/customized_haproxy_router.html#obtaining-router-configuration-template [2] https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/3.11/install_config/router/customized_haproxy_router.html#using-configmap-replace-template [3] https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS

Metrics

Weaknesses (1)

References (61)

Change history (0)

No recorded changes yet.

Sources
CVE.org / MITRE
Status PUBLISHED
Assigner redhat
Published Feb 8, 2013
Updated Aug 6, 2024
Reserved Dec 6, 2012
NVD
Status Modified
Modified Jun 16, 2026
Red Hat
Severity Moderate
Public date Feb 4, 2013