MEDIUM
The original design of TCP does not check that the TCP Acknowledgement number in an ICMP error message generated by an intermediate router is within the range of possible values for data that has already been acknowledged (aka "TCP acknowledgement number checking"), which makes it easier for attackers to forge ICMP error messages for specific TCP connections and cause a denial of service, as demonstrated using (1) blind connection-reset attacks with forged "Destination Unreachable" messages, (2) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged "Source Quench" messages, or (3) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged ICMP messages that cause the Path MTU to be reduced
Published Jan 19, 2005
5.0
MEDIUMCVSS 2.0
EPSS 10.74%
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