HIGH
The original design of TCP does not check that the TCP sequence number in an ICMP error message is within the range of sequence numbers for data that has been sent but not acknowledged (aka "TCP sequence number checking"), which makes it easier for attackers to forge ICMP error messages for specific TCP connections and cause a denial of service, as demonstrated using (1) blind connection-reset attacks with forged "Destination Unreachable" messages, (2) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged "Source Quench" messages, or (3) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged ICMP messages that cause the Path MTU to be reduced
Published Jan 19, 2005
10.0
HIGHCVSS 2.0
EPSS 1.94%
Description
Affected products
Remediation
Metrics
References (2)
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